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Abstract
This paper explores how political processes shape the information technology (IT) systems implemented by small-medium
sized firms. Systems designers, consultants and users often interpret technology in different ways. This may result in the
implementation of inappropriate systems. Small business managers work on short time scales and may be more concerned with
operational matters rather than strategic considerations. A case study of CableCo, a small make-to-order company, is used to
explore the political processes that shaped the selection and implementation of the Company’s IT system. The incongruence
between the ‘technological frames’ of the stakeholders is examined. Researchers, consultants and managers will learn that the
implementation of IT is determined by the dominant ‘frame’.
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1. Introduction
In the main, research into information technology
(IT) has tended to focus upon large companies. There
is a dearth of empirical research focusing upon IT in
small businesses [10]. Likewise in manufacturing, the
literature has mainly focused upon make-to-stock
(MTS) environments [16]. The limited research in
make-to-order (MTO) companies has focused on strat-
egy [25] and on planning in subcontract engineering
job shops [16].
This paper describes the issues and problems of
implementing an IT system in CableCo, an MTO
company operating in the insulated wire and cable
industry. The authors were part of a university-based
research team that included three engineers and a
social scientist. They were brought in by the Company
to manage the transition from a manual paperwork
system to an integrated computerised system. The
challenge facing the Research Team was to select
an appropriate IT system taking into consideration
the market environment, the complexity of the pro-
ducts and business processes and company strategy.
The paper specifies the features required for an inte-
grated IT system.
The research project was supported by the United
Kingdom Government funded Teaching Company
Scheme, which funds Teaching Company Pro-
grammes. The aim of the Scheme is to strengthen
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the competitiveness and wealth creation of the small
business sector by providing access to the expertise of
universities. Teaching Company Programmes are
collaborative partnerships between small and med-
ium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and universities. Aca-
demics receive funding to participate in industrially
based projects that can enhance their research and
teaching.
The proposal, which was agreed by the Company,
the University and the Teaching Company Directorate,
included objectives, a detailed plan and outcomes
based upon an integrated IT strategy. However, as
the project progressed, the Managing Director (MD)
rejected the IT strategy and plan. Management
requirements were fluid and the aims, objectives, plan
and tasks became the subject of continuous negotia-
tion between the research team and the Company. This
made it difficult to use a formal software development
methodology. The IT system that was eventually
implemented was considerably different in scope to
the system outlined in the original proposal, but it did
satisfy the MD.
The paper seeks to understand these changes by
exploring the decision-making processes and the poli-
tical processes impacting upon the project. A theore-
tical framework is developed to examine how these
political processes shaped the selection and imple-
mentation of the IT system at CableCo. This analysis
explains why an initially well-defined problem with
clear requirements became an unstructured problem
with unclear objectives.
The paper begins with a description of the research
methodology. This is followed by a review of IT
strategy, requirements definition and implementation.
CableCo and the Programme proposal are described
next. The progress and outcomes of the project are
then outlined including the development of the Func-
tional Specification and the selection of the IT system
and software package. The concept of ‘technological
frames’ [33] is then used to explore how political
processes shaped the technology that was eventually
adopted.
The research will be helpful to IT researchers,
managers and consultants engaged in implementing
IT in small-medium sized enterprises. It demonstrates
how the political processes shape the technology that
is implemented. The research also shows that stake-
holders need to understand each others’ mindsets. This
work should also be of interest to those considering
participating in a Teaching Company Programme.
2. Methodology
Nandhakumar and Jones have lamented the ‘‘pau-
city of engaged studies’’ [31, p. 128] in IT research.
They argue that interpretive researchers need to inter-
act with the phenomena that they are studying. This
could provide researchers with a deeper understanding
of the research context and its actors. The methodol-
ogy adopted by the Research Team was action
research, which is embedded in the interpretive phi-
losophical framework [43]. Action research has been
cited as ‘‘ideally suited to the study of technology in its
human context’’ [3, p. 235].
The Teaching Company Programme at CableCo
provided the Research Team with an opportunity to
study ‘IT in action’. Fig. 1 depicts the framework that
was used to explore the internal factors that shaped the
formation and implementation of IT at CableCo. It is
based upon ‘technological frames’ [33] and the impact
of political processes on technological change [26].
From the social construction of technology perspec-
tive the characteristics and capabilities of the technol-
ogy are not considered as technical matters that are
resolved outside of the firm. Instead the technology is
viewed as a product of the political process, which is
subject to argument and dispute during and after it has
been implemented.
Fig. 1 shows that the development and implemen-
tation of the IT system was the outcome of a three-
phase interaction between the Managing Director
and the Research Team. Phase one was the planning
stage. Members of the Team held preliminary meet-
ings with the MD to discuss the setting up of a
Teaching Company Programme with the Company.
A proposal was produced for submission to the
Teaching Company Directorate, which included a
definition of objectives and a plan of work. Phase
two was the Programme initiation stage. Budgets
and accounts were set-up and a Teaching Company
Associate (TCA) was appointed to work on the pro-
ject. Phase three was the implementation of the Pro-
gramme. Information technology requirements, the
system implemented and the project itself were
socially shaped through the operations of the Local
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Management Committee (LMC), monthly meetings of
the academic and industrial supervisors with the TCA,
weekly meetings of the academic supervisors with the
TCA and the operations of the Business Process
Improvement Teams.
There were two main sources of empirical data. The
Research Team spent at least half a day per week at
CableCo for 2 years. Meetings were held with the MD
(as Industrial Supervisor) and the Associate, which
provided an opportunity to discuss progress and to set
targets. The Business Process Improvement Teams’
meetings were usually of 2–3 hours duration, although
some lasted all day. Detailed notes were taken at all
meetings. The second source of data was the Associate
himself who acted as a participant observer during his
2 years with the Company. Information was passed
formally to the academic supervisors in the form of
reports and informally during regular meetings.
3. Information technology: strategy and
implementation
It is important to ensure that IT is properly aligned
with the business strategy of the company [13].
Research conducted in SMEs, however, indicates that
there is little emphasis on strategic thinking amongst
the management of these firms. Investment in IT is
regarded as a cost [21]. The instability of the business
environment confronting small firms is regarded as a
major obstacle to business planning and ultimately to
investment in IT [12]. SMEs have tended to focus on
the selection of software packages rather than on the
definition of requirements [7]. SMEs purchase IT
primarily to improve the efficiency of existing pro-
cesses, or to improve communications with the wider
customer base, rather than to develop strategic cap-
ability [22,23]. The successful implementation of IT in
small firms has been found to be strongly influenced
by assumptions, expectations, knowledge, background
and characteristics of the owner-manager [12,44].
Owner attributes also have a greater impact upon IT
satisfaction than any business factors [29]. Manufac-
turing firms have the lowest levels of satisfaction [36].
Furthermore, research has indicated that only 9% of
SMEs used a structured IT development methodology
to identify their information needs [29].
A major criticism of structured methodologies is
that they have ‘‘paid little attention to technologists’
assumptions, expectations, knowledge, and how these
may differ from the frames of managers and users for
whom the technology is being built’’ [33, p. 203]. It is
important for systems designers, managers and users
to recognise that IT is the product of social action [35].
Technologists and change agents need to be aware that
they are intervening in the social and political systems
of those companies where they are identifying systems
requirements and implementing IT.
3.1. Social shaping of technology
Change agents can adopt one of three roles: top–
down champion, bottom–up champion or dual role
champion [9]. Although change is a team effort there
is usually one individual who takes responsibility for
motivating the workforce and securing commitment
for change. To be successful, this individual needs to
have access to adequate resources and to be fully
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Fig. 1. Factors shaping the formation and implementation of IT at CableCo.
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supported by senior management. In an SME, where
power and authority may be concentrated in the hands
of one or two individuals, the introduction of any new
technology requires the full support of the MD, espe-
cially when the technology may have structural,
operational and strategic ramifications.
From the social construction of technology perspec-
tive there is a ‘duality of technology’ [32] involving a
reciprocal interaction between people and information
systems. Organisations have been described as poli-
tical entities [37], where the design and shaping of
technology is seen as the outcome of negotiations
between a multiplicity of stakeholders [47]. Change
agents therefore require political expertise when
engaged in technological and organisational change
[5]. Orlikowski [32, p. 406] argues that ‘‘(t)echnology
is the product of human action, while it also assumes
structural properties. That is, technology is physically
constructed by actors working in a given social con-
text, and technology is socially constructed by actors
through the different meanings they attach to it and the
various features they emphasize and use’’. In other
words, technology can be viewed as a ‘‘cultural
product that is socially constructed . . . as the conse-
quence of political action within the adopting context’’
[26, p. 19].
To understand how people interpret and interact
with technology, Orlikowski and Gash [33, p. 179]
developed the concept of ‘technological frames’.
These encompass ‘‘people’s assumptions, expecta-
tions and knowledge about the purpose, context,
importance and role of technology’’. These ‘frames’
may facilitate or constrain how technological issues
and problems are resolved in the new operational
configuration. During periods of change, stakeholders
may interpret the new technologies in different ways,
leading to incongruence between their respective
‘frames’. This may inhibit learning, especially if some
of the stakeholders make sense of a technology
through ‘frames’ associated with an old technology.
It is, however, still possible to implement a new
technological system, even when there is conflict,
by developing a set of common understandings which
satisfy the different stakeholders. The role of the
change agent, or ‘configurational intrapreneur’, is
to challenge the prevailing shared belief systems
and technological practices and to secure legitimacy
for establishing new operational configurations [26].
However, the full extent of change and the likely
outcomes cannot be anticipated a priori, because the
implementation of change is subject to social shaping
[34].
The case study of CableCo shows how the ‘frames’
of the stakeholders, institutional structures, attitudes to
change, expertise and power shaped the IT system that
was selected and implemented at the Company.
4. CableCo: markets, products and processes
In 1999, the global cable industry had annual sales
of US$ 70 billion. It was a highly fragmented mature
industry, producing low margin commodity products.
The top 10 manufacturers cumulatively accounted for
37% of the global market [6]. Regional manufacturers
accounted for a high proportion of industry sales. In
1999, industry observers estimated that imported
cable satisfied approximately half of UK demand.
This was predicted to increase due to the rationalisa-
tion and consolidation of the industry.
CableCo had a turnover of £5 million and employed
50 people in Northern England. The Company
embarked on a £2 million expansion to double its
output. Decision-making was highly centralised. The
MD took responsibility for marketing, sales and
finance, whilst the General Manager was responsible
for manufacturing, procurement and distribution.
CableCo had approximately 0.1% share of the domes-
tic cable market. The Company’s objective was to
have 55% of its business in the home market and 45%
overseas. It exported cable to over 40 countries. This
gave rise to complex marketing, commercial decisions
and logistics. This made the early dispatch and co-
ordination of production to meet delivery require-
ments particularly important.
4.1. The CableCo Teaching Company Programme
The Company used manual systems throughout its
business. Management saw ITas a means of enhancing
customer service, reducing lead-times and improving
operational efficiency and control. This would lead to
increased productivity, lower costs and enhanced flex-
ibility [41]. CableCo allocated a budget of £110,000 to
cover staffing, hardware, software, implementation
and training, which equated to 2% of turnover. IT
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investment levels are generally in the range 1–3%
[46].
The Research Team in consultation with CableCo
and the Teaching Company Consultant (appointed by
the Teaching Company Directorate) completed a grant
application form. CableCo and the University signed a
formal contract the ‘joint commitment statement’ that
included a detailed work plan. Under the terms of the
contract, the Company would receive IT consultancy
whilst the academics would have an opportunity to
investigate the IT requirements of an MTO company.
The development of the Programme plan pro-
gressed smoothly. The academics had experience of
working on previous programmes with similar objec-
tives. The proposed plan was based upon this experi-
ence and was formally agreed with the Company.
Although the MD did not fully understand the work
outlined in the plan, he fully supported the Pro-
gramme.
When the grant had been awarded, a selection panel
comprising the academics, the MD and the General
Manager recruited a Teaching Company Associate.
The LMC took overall responsibility for the manage-
ment of the Programme and met on a quarterly basis.
The Committee’s membership comprised the MD and
the General Manager from CableCo, the TCA, the
Teaching Company Consultant, and the academics.
The role of the LMC was to monitor the progress of the
project, to approve expenditure and to ensure that the
budgets were properly managed. The LMC also had
the power to make changes to the plan that had been
agreed. In addition, the academic and industrial super-
visors met with the TCA for half a day per week to
enable the transfer of knowledge and skills into the
Company. They also held monthly meetings to review
progress, plan future work, coordinate the project and
resolve any issues or difficulties. The Research Team
viewed these monthly meetings with management as
an opportunity for ‘perspective taking’ [28]. In other
words, it would allow the academics and management
to understand and appreciate each other’s knowledge,
values, meanings, assumptions and beliefs.
At the planning stage the academics were in a
powerful position. They had expertise that CableCo
required and were a route to Government subsidy.
After the grant had been awarded, the power balance
shifted in favour of the Company. The TCA’s contract
of employment was with the University, but he worked
at CableCo and reported to the MD on a daily basis.
This gave the MD a strong influence over the tasks
carried out by the TCA. All aspects of the Programme
became the subject of negotiation at the monthly
meetings and at the LMC. This had an impact on
priorities, objectives, tasks performed, the allocation
of resources, the IT development methodology that
was adopted and the technology that was implemen-
ted.
It became clear during the regular monthly meet-
ings that it was CableCo’s major shareholders who
were the driving force behind the investment in IT.
They saw this investment as essential to protect the
Company’s market position. The MD and the General
Manager, on the other hand, had little understanding of
the capabilities of the technology. To them IT offered
operational improvements. Increasing the productivity
of the clerical staff by 20% would allow a significant
expansion of the business without the need for more
staff. Furthermore, it was anticipated that the propor-
tion of enquiries converted to firm orders would
increase by 5% due to the faster processing of enqui-
ries and improved delivery performance.
4.2. Business strategy
CableCo had radically different business and man-
ufacturing strategies to its competitors. For its size, the
Company had a complex supply network because it
exported cable all over the world. The large cable
manufacturers were able to reap economies of scale by
producing cable in high volumes. CableCo suffered a
cost disadvantage as it produced cable in lower
volumes. Customers’ switching costs were low. Price
and delivery were paramount. CableCo achieved com-
petitive advantage through flexibility and customer
intimacy [45].
4.3. Manufacturing strategy
CableCo manufactured its products on an MTO
basis as a means of minimising inventory and working
capital. This was in contrast to its larger competitors
who operated predominantly on an MTS basis, which
minimised set-up activities and maximised resource
utilisation. The decision whether to operate on an MTO
or MTS basis was a strategic issue as it had a direct
effect on costs, inventory, flexibility and delivery [25].
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The drawback of the MTO strategy was that it
increased operational complexity and reduced the uti-
lisation of manufacturing resources due to the require-
ment for a large number of set-ups; this also increased
scrap rates. The Research Team suggested that the
Company should consider manufacturing high volume
standard items on an MTS basis to improve resource
utilisation and delivery performance.
The MTO strategy had major consequences for
manufacturing planning and control and therefore
on the features required from a software package. It
linked items of inventory to specific orders; it exposed
customers to the whole cumulative lead-time, which
meant that information on the production status was
required to answer customer enquiries. Non-value
adding changeovers reduced resource utilisation and
made production scheduling complex. The need to
coordinate the manufacture of different products
within an order caused further complexity. The MD
had difficulty appreciating that appropriate software
selection was contingent upon these factors.
4.4. Business Process Improvement Teams
The TCA established, trained and led cross-func-
tional Business Process Improvement Teams. Their
objective was to examine the business processes and to
identify IT requirements. As a ‘bottom–up champion’
[9], he was responsible for convincing staff of the need
for change as well as directing, managing and deliver-
ing the project. The members of the Business Process
Improvement Teams were very cooperative because
they welcomed the participative approach of the
research team. These employees had knowledge and
information that was not readily available to manage-
ment [15]. They understood the need for a new IT
system and they were very constructive in discussing
the operation of the existing systems, identifying
shortcomings and making suggestions on possible
improvements. Formal reports were produced that
described the sales order processing, despatch, stock
control and quality control processes.
The academics and the TCA acted as facilitators at
these business process meetings [30]. The MD
attended some of the earlier meetings but took a
passive role. He made it clear at the monthly meetings
with the academics that he was becoming increasingly
frustrated. He could not understand why the existing
systems were being analysed. He also had strong
reservations about employees being involved in dis-
cussions relating to system requirements. The aca-
demics spent a considerable amount of time reminding
the MD of the partnership nature of the project and the
importance of sticking to the plan. His approach
appeared to be opportunist rather than strategic
[29]. He could see little reason for taking a systematic
approach to IT planning and software selection,
although he had previously agreed to this in the plan.
He thought that any off-the-shelf ‘industry standard
package’ would suffice. The thrust of his argument
was that the IT used by competitors would be equally
suitable for his business. He did not appear to appreci-
ate the complexity of the Company’s operations rela-
tive to its competitors, which was due to the MTO
strategy and the need to coordinate the production of
different products within orders.
The researchers stressed that a strategic view on
software package selection, including an assessment of
the technical capability of the system, was essential [7].
Software packages should effectively support business
processes and contribute to competitiveness [38]. Due
to their limited expertise, technical know-how and
financial resources small firms often select software
packages ad-hoc, rather than in terms of clearly defined
requirements [7]. This can significantly increase risk,
because the precise system requirements and limita-
tions of the software may not become clear until the IT
system is implemented. At this stage, customisation of
the software may be expensive. Companies can
become victims of the ‘technology productivity para-
dox’, in which inappropriate IT systems waste
resources and produce little or no benefit [24].
The academics advocated a structured software
selection procedure based upon an analysis of require-
ments, which would be formally documented. Potential
solutions were to be assessed through demonstrations
by vendors and visits to other companies using the
software. The aim was to identify a package that met
CableCo’s requirements with minimum modification.
However, the objections of the MD made it impossible
for the TCA to fully apply a structured methodology to
analyse the business processes. This was because the
MD was not prepared to allow him the necessary time
to learn about structured methods. Instead, he had to
use flow diagrams (which he was already familiar with)
to analyse the processes.
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4.5. Development of a Functional Specification
Based upon the business process analysis exercise
and subsequent meetings with the Business Process
Improvement Teams and management, a Functional
Specification was produced that defined the Com-
pany’s IT requirements. The particular requirements
for the various subsystems will now be considered.
The procurement function was relatively simple and
straightforward requiring no special features. The
purchasing of copper was a task performed by the
General Manager because it constituted a large pro-
portion of cost (50% for a single core cable) and the
price fluctuated on a daily basis. He required informa-
tion on the copper price, current stock levels and
anticipated demand.
The requirements for manufacturing planning and
control were different from the features provided in a
standard MRPII system [19]. Firstly, the product
structure of each order was random, reflecting the
pattern of individual customer requirements at a given
time. The MTO strategy ensured that gross and net
requirements were usually similar. Manufacturing,
therefore, had to respond directly to the product
volume and mix within the order book. This made
production scheduling a difficult and particularly
important activity. Common objectives were to max-
imise resource utilisation and productivity, whilst
coordinating the supply of different products to satisfy
complete orders by their due dates. These require-
ments were frequently in conflict and needed to be
resolved by management, who required access to data
on production and order book status, priorities, due
dates and current and planned resource availability. A
computerised manufacturing planning system could
schedule production using a finite loading approach,
with periodic regeneration. Cyclical scheduling,
where items were produced on a regular periodic
basis, would simplify scheduling and allow customers
to know when particular product types were to be
produced.
The minimum run lengths and consequent stock
levels for products were determined by their usage
patterns, cash flow forecasts as well as set-up and
stock holding costs. Cost models were developed to
enable trade-offs to be evaluated. Cable in high
demand could be produced in longer runs to reduce
the disruption associated with excessive set-ups. This
would entail shifting towards an MTS policy for
products in high demand, with management specify-
ing the maximum stock levels for each item. Cables
with infrequent demand would continue to be manu-
factured on an MTO basis. This approach would
increase the importance of stock control, simplify
production scheduling, and increase resource utilisa-
tion and productivity. It was surprising to find that the
stock turn ratio for the Company was 6, compared with
the industry average of 9.2 [42], which included MTS
companies. This suggests that CableCo’s MTO strat-
egy had significant shortcomings, and that the Com-
pany was holding unexpectedly high levels of stock,
some of it possibly obsolete.
Sales and order processing was a two stage process.
The first was the quotation stage where the price and
sometimes the delivery date were specified. Prices
were obtained from standard price lists, although in
some cases management was prepared to negotiate
special terms for preferred customers. The capability
to adjust the price of individual products, subject to
achieving a satisfactory margin for the whole order,
was a particular feature that was required. Data on past
payment records were needed to determine the com-
mercial basis of the quotation. Quoting delivery dates
was often problematic since there could be many
‘floating’ quotations awaiting a response from custo-
mers. The actual demand and factory load in future
periods was therefore unknown. Hierarchical backlog
methods have been developed for controlling manu-
facturing lead-times in MTO manufacturing [16]. The
second stage was order acceptance, which required
that the price and delivery date quoted were confirmed
and the customer’s current credit status was checked.
The system must provide information on prices, the
production schedule and resource availability as well
as accounting information relating to the customer.
The marketing function required breakdowns of
past turnover and profit by market, customers, type
of customer, period and products. An analysis of
demand patterns was also important as it provided a
basis for making contact with customers and forecast-
ing aggregate demand. The establishment of a web site
was considered a crucial part of management strategy
to increase exports. The Team were, however, con-
cerned that the marketing strategy should be aligned
with the manufacturing strategy. A pure MTO strategy
could constrain CableCo’s ability to fulfil the expected
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increase in orders. Furthermore, a strategic approach
was urged to ensure that capacity constraints did
not undermine the Company’s ability to secure high
margin orders.
The accounting module required standard financial
accounting capabilities, although the Company was
considering applying Activity Based Costing [17] as a
means of improving the accuracy of cost estimates.
The major cost drivers were identified as labour, order
processing, machine set-ups, materials and energy
consumption.
4.6. Package selection
The MD was advised that adopting a customised
software solution for the business was too costly,
would take too long and was not feasible. A multi-
phased methodology [20] was therefore adopted for
identifying and implementing an off-the-shelf soft-
ware package. The discrete phases in this approach
included definition of requirements and purchase of
software, installation, and modification of internal
procedures, conversion of data, training and documen-
tation.
A list of 30 potentially suitable software packages
was obtained from the Computer Users’ Yearbook [8].
All the potential suppliers were supplied with a sum-
mary of the requirements documented in the Func-
tional Specification, and they were invited to complete
a survey form that identified software functionality,
features, implementation details, costs and support
arrangements. Copies of each software vendors’
accounts were also obtained and analysed to establish
their commercial strength and financial viability. A
preliminary short list was drawn up and the vendors
were then contacted by telephone to obtain further
details and to clarify requirements. Six software sup-
pliers were then invited to visit the Company to
demonstrate their software. These suppliers were pro-
vided with appropriate test data, so that the demon-
strations could be directly relevant and easy to
compare. This was followed by two site visits to
investigate the application of the preferred system
in a company with similar characteristics to CableCo.
In the meantime, the MD became more preoccupied
with the plans to extend the factory. The aim was to
double the output of cable. The strategic and opera-
tional factors driving this expansion strategy were not
entirely clear from the perspective of the Research
Team. The integrity of the plan and the partnership
nature of the scheme were again called into question
when the MD started to allocate the TCA tasks
associated with the factory expansion. The academics
were concerned that this would put the IT project
behind schedule. Moreover, it raised a fundamental
question about whom the TCA reported to, and who
was responsible for determining the work that he was
allocated. The Local Management Committee, which
was chaired by the MD, never really addressed this
issue.
There was a delay of several months whilst the MD
reconsidered the position. Some of the potential soft-
ware had little scope for customisation, whilst other
alternatives were very flexible and could be configured
with ease. There appeared to be a fundamental choice.
Either the Company could adopt rigid software and
then try and change its business processes to suit, or it
could tailor flexible software to meet the exact require-
ments laid down in the Functional Specification. The
academics clearly had a preference for the latter
approach and recommended Platsoft as the most
appropriate software. The MD was not at ease with
either approach and he had still not accepted the need
to match the software solutions to the business pro-
cesses. He took the radical step of reviewing his
requirements and decided to purchase Impact Encore
software for the accounting and sales order processing
functions. The software did not support the other
business functions and had not been originally
short-listed. The MD identified the software through
his network of personal contacts, which is a common
approach in small companies [18]. It was selected
mainly on the basis of cost rather than functionality.
The package did not support export sales, which made
it necessary for the TCA to develop a bespoke data-
base. The resultant system comprised manual systems,
the Impact Encore software and a bespoke database.
There were many positive outcomes from the pro-
ject. Firstly, computer hardware, software and net-
working were installed in a company that had virtually
no IT at the outset. There was extensive training of
staff in general IT (word processing, spreadsheets and
databases) as well as specific training relating to the
use of the selected package. The introduction of e-mail
enhanced internal and external communications. This,
together with the web site, proved very significant,
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given the international nature of the Company’s mar-
kets. The IT system also increased the efficiency of the
administrative functions. It supported a 36% increase
in turnover arising from the factory extension with the
same number of administrative staff. However, the
other business functions, including manufacturing did
not benefit from the implementation of IT as intended.
The Research Team and the MD had different
perspectives towards IT. From the MD’s perspective,
the project was a considerable success. He had
achieved his objective of implementing an IT system,
as requested by his shareholders. To the academics, it
was a qualified success; more could have been
achieved. The next section explores the ‘technological
frames’ of the MD and the Research Team. The aim is
to show how the ‘frames’ of the two parties helped to
shape the technology that was adopted.
5. Technological frames of the Research Team
and the Managing Director
Table 1 describes the ‘technological frames’ of the
Research Team and the Managing Director. It com-
prises the type of partnership plus three core domains:
nature of technology, technology structure and tech-
nology in use [33]. The type of partnership includes
the interpretation and attitudes of the two parties to the
management of the Programme. The first core domain
refers to people’s understanding of the capabilities and
functionality of the technology. The second comprises
the reasons why the technology was acquired and
implemented, including its likely value to the firm.
The third refers to how the technology was to be used
and any associated consequences of this use. These
domains can be used to understand the type of incon-
gruence that existed between the research team and
the MD.
5.1. Type of partnership
It became apparent during the progress of the project
that the Research Team and the MD had fundamental
differences in their interpretation of ‘partnership’. To
the Research Team, the Teaching Company Pro-
gramme was an equal partnership between the Com-
pany, the academics and the TCA. It was underpinned
by a binding contract, but it also relied heavily on
Table 1
Technological frames of research team and the Managing Director
Research Team Managing Director
Type of partnership
Equal partnership between Company, academics and TCA Company is customer
Agreed proposal part of binding contract All aspects of proposal open to negotiation
Programme changes need to be agreed Programme determined by Company
TCA reports to LMC TCA reports to MD
Academics transfer knowledge Academics paid for time
Nature of technology
Understanding business processes is important No systems perspective
Business processes should be integrated Integration not necessary
IT requirements should be carefully defined No real understanding of IT
Technology strategy
IT should support business and manufacturing strategy Limited strategic perspective
Strategic supply chain management Responsive to customer orders and requirements
Combined MTS/MTO strategy MTO strategy
Software package to meet Company requirements ‘General industry’ package
Staged implementation Install as quickly as possible
Technology in use
Training very important Training very important
Enrich or change work of employees Control work of employees
Relatively open access to data Carefully restrict access to data
Provide strategic information to management for
decision-making
Preference for soft information provided by customers
and suppliers
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‘goodwill trust’ [39]. As such, any changes to the
Programme had to be agreed between the academic
and industrial supervisors. The academics were pre-
pared to be flexible and accommodating. They saw
their role as three-fold: transferring knowledge to
CableCo, developing the competencies of the TCA
and conducting IT research.
The MD viewed the Company as a customer rather
than as a partner and a recipient of knowledge. The
academics were no different to any other supplier,
though he respected the knowledge that they had. He
kept a keen watch to ensure that they spent the
required time in the Company, as specified in the
contract. He did not see the project proposal as a
binding contract; it was open to challenge and nego-
tiation. The MD also regarded the Associate as an
employee since he worked in the Company. He
believed, therefore, that it was his prerogative to direct
the work of the Associate.
5.2. Nature of technology
The Research Team envisaged that CableCo would
be transformed from a company with a couple of
computers to one with IT integrated into its business
processes. The focus was upon providing information
for strategic decision-making as well as improving the
operational efficiency of the Company. This would
enhance the flexibility of CableCo, increase the uti-
lisation of resources, reduce costs and contribute to
competitive advantage.
The two managers had considerable experience of
the cable industry. They recognised that the manual
system could no longer cope with the wider custo-
mer base. The only solution to remain competitive
was to switch to a computerised system. The man-
agers did not, however, appreciate the potential of
IT. This could be partly explained by the fact that
they were middle-aged businessmen with limited
exposure to new technologies [29]. To the MD, it
was simply a case of taking the manual system out
and slotting the IT system in its place. The outcome
was that the MD continuously questioned the need
to systematically analyse and plan the Company’s IT
requirements.
The MD’s dominant ‘frame’ was strongly influ-
enced by Taylorist beliefs on how to organise produc-
tion. Decision-making was highly centralised. The
MD saw the IT as supporting, or reinforcing the
existing configuration of technological, organisational
and human resources. He certainly did not envisage
these processes being transformed by the work of the
‘configurational intrapreneurs’. The monthly meetings
failed in their objective of encouraging ‘perspective
taking’ between the researchers and the MD. Perhaps,
if the General Manager had attended these meetings
the limitations of the production strategy may have
been given more consideration. He could have con-
firmed the shortcomings of the MTO strategy. How-
ever, given the hierarchical nature of CableCo and the
dominant position of the MD, it is doubtful whether
the outcome would have been different.
The employees welcomed the implementation of
the IT system. They had gained an appreciation of
the benefits through the workings of the Business
Process Improvement Teams. To them, the technol-
ogy presented an opportunity to increase their skills,
as well as protecting their jobs in a very competitive
industry.
5.3. Technology strategy
The IT requirements for a company pursuing an
MTO strategy are different to that of an MTS com-
pany. The Research Team advocated that CableCo
should adopt an MTS strategy for frequently ordered
cable. This would allow CableCo to adopt longer
production runs, thereby adding more value by redu-
cing the number of set-ups. It would also reduce
internal and external complexity in the business pro-
cesses. This is because the preparation and dispatching
of orders are time consuming, costly and prone to
error. Delays can have a major impact on production
and sales performance. An effective IT system inte-
grated into the business processes could reduce the
amount of paperwork, reduce administrative costs and
improve cycle times.
The Team saw the technology as transforming the
operational and strategic capability of CableCo. The
IT would allow more information to be shared intern-
ally with and between employees and externally with
customers and suppliers. CableCo would be able to
reduce its costs, increase productivity and expand
its customer base. The Team were also aware that
these changes would impact on jobs, work practices
and the culture of the organisation. Decision-making
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responsibility would need to be formally delegated
to employees lower down in the organisation. The
Team were aware that the MD was not keen on this
proposal.
Acting against the Research Team’s advice, the MD
decided that a less ambitious strategy was appropriate.
He decided to purchase a software package to manage
sales order processing and accounting. His objective
was to improve the existing operations for which he
was directly responsible [22]. This had the effect of
reinforcing managerial control by restricting ad-hoc
decision-making and the amount of information avail-
able to employees. Crucially, the application of com-
puter aided production management systems (CAPM)
was excluded. The MD was not interested in collecting
data for strategic planning. This is evidence that in
many SMEs IT systems are developed incrementally
[14]. It also explains why SMEs have incompatible
systems that are difficult to network [1].
The Research Team were concerned that the MD
had rejected CAPM and an MTS policy for frequently
ordered cable. Surprisingly, the Company’s stock turn
ratio was lower that the sector average, which included
many MTS companies. The MTO strategy: (i) exposed
customers to cumulative lead-times; (ii) involved
many changeover operations which significantly
reduced operational efficiency; (iii) made planning
and control complex and difficult because inventory
was linked to specific customer orders. This led to
missed delivery dates and partial shipments. The
absence of a manufacturing planning and control
system made it necessary for status enquiries to be
dealt with manually. Cost was more important to the
MD than functionality. CableCo had already com-
mitted funds to expand its premises. A limited IT
system was considered prudent during a period of high
expenditure.
5.4. Technology in use
The Research Team reluctantly complied with the
MD’s request. He wanted the system up and running as
soon as possible. A computer system was installed into
a company that had virtually no IT. Employees were
trained in word-processing, spreadsheets, databases,
email and Impact Encore.
The Research Team recommended employee
empowerment as a means of remaining competitive
[4]. The MD regarded this as impinging on managerial
authority. He was suspicious of a technology that
could provide employees with relatively open access
to data. His preference was to minimise the amount of
information available to the workforce. This had a
strong influence on the IT system that was installed.
Further, it prevented the management team from
having access to more strategic data. The preference
of the MD was to rely upon ‘soft’ information from
customers and suppliers [27].
Many companies fail to appreciate the full cost of
their investment in IT. In many cases, ‘instinct’ [2] or
‘intuition’ [11] are often used to assess the value and
expected benefits to be derived from the system. The
MD commented that ‘‘the direct financial benefits to
the Company were difficult to quantify, although the
perceived benefits were high. CableCo now had a web
site that had raised the marketing profile of the
Company. It was now possible to take orders by email.
As CableCo had a large export market these devel-
opments were significant’’.
CableCo had invested in an extension to the fac-
tory in order to expand its business. The IT had
provided the infrastructure necessary to support
the increase in volume of orders (sales increased
by 36%) with the same level of administrative staff.
This represents a considerable increase in value
added compared to the previous manual systems.
The IT system provided up-to-date records of cus-
tomer requirements and their credit positions. This
improved the level of service provided to customers
whilst minimising the financial exposure, which
previously occurred when credit limits were acciden-
tally exceeded.
The Research Team stated that the system imple-
mented fell far short of what had been originally
agreed. However, the MD was satisfied. The aca-
demics were concerned that instead of building on
the work of the Business Process Improvement Teams,
the ‘technological frame’ of the MD would restrict the
acquisition and dissemination of information. This
could limit the ability of the Company to learn causing
a negative impact on potential performance [40].
5.5. Discussion
In their role as ‘configurational intrapreneurs’,
the ability of the Team to bring about change was
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constrained because the belief system of the MD’s
dominant ‘frame’ was entrenched. It was not open to
alternative interpretations that advocated major
changes to existing socio-technical configurations.
Nevertheless, the Business Process Improvement
Teams were highly successful. Employees became
more favourably disposed to change. This was due
to the hard work of the politically astute TCA who was
very adept at working within and around the con-
straints imposed by the conflicting ‘frames’.
There are several lessons that can be drawn from
this case study. It is important to identify the com-
mon assumptions, expectations and knowledge of the
various stakeholders [33]. This would help to iden-
tify any incongruity between stakeholders’ ‘frames’,
and any internal inconsistencies within ‘frames’.
However, the interaction between stakeholders is a
dynamic process. It is not possible to predict all of
the internal and external factors that may impact
upon the relationship. During this period the cable
industry was undergoing retrenchment, as the
large companies divested their operations in the
UK. The Research Team found it difficult to com-
prehend CableCo’s expansion strategy, which con-
centrated on producing low margin cable. The MD,
however, did not consider Company strategy to be
part of the remit of the project; it was not a subject
for discussion.
The MD had little understanding of the capabilities
of IT and the opportunities that the technology offered
to CableCo. There was incongruence between the
Research Team and management in all four domains.
This did not prevent the Company from purchasing an
IT system. The outcome was that the system that was
acquired corresponded to the dominant ‘frame’ of the
MD. His objectives were to reduce costs and increase
management control.
There were inconsistencies within the ‘frame’ of the
MD. His marketing strategy required a £2 million
expansion of the factory to produce high volume
cable. This investment was high risk for a company
with a turnover of £5 million, in an industry under-
going rationalisation. An MTS manufacturing strategy
for cable in high demand would minimise changeover
costs; but he rejected it. The MTO strategy increased
costs and undermined the financial feasibility of
the factory expansion. The failure to align the market-
ing and manufacturing strategies caused a dramatic
deterioration in CableCo’s overall financial perfor-
mance.
The planned investment in ITof £110,000 was small
in comparison with the factory expansion, which was
taking place at the same time. This explains the MD’s
relative priorities. Furthermore, as the building work
progressed there were cash flow difficulties, which
dominated the MD’s thinking. His desire to reduce
costs influenced the decision to purchase the Impact
Encore software rather than implement an integrated
solution.
6. Conclusions
The Teaching Company Programme at CableCo
provided the Research Team with an opportunity to
work in partnership with a small MTO company
requiring expertise to identify its IT requirements.
A contract was signed to implement an integrated
system to support all of the business processes. The
IT strategy proposed by the academics (and originally
agreed by the Managing Director) satisfied the Teach-
ing Company Directorate, which requires ambitious
‘strategic business projects’ that lead to major
improvements in company performance. Make-to-
order companies benefit from integrated systems
because: (i) individual items of inventory are linked
to customer orders; (ii) it is necessary to coordinate the
production of items within customer orders; (iii) cus-
tomer enquiries may require information on the status
of production; (iv) production scheduling and inven-
tory management are often complex.
The Managing Director, however, became fru-
strated at the length of time required to analyse the
business processes in order or to identify the Com-
pany’s IT requirements. He was also concerned that
the proposed system might empower the workforce
and challenge managerial prerogatives. The imple-
mentation of the IT system was taking place in
parallel with a significant expansion of manufacturing
capacity. This was to enable the production of high
volume, low margin cable required by the marketing
strategy. The Research Team, however, had difficulty
comprehending this strategy in an industry under-
going rationalisation and consolidation. It was high
risk. In comparison, the investment in IT was less
strategically important to the MD. His objective was
254 T. McGovern, C. Hicks / Information & Management 42 (2004) 243–257
to expand the business without increasing adminis-
trative costs. As a consequence, the financial diffi-
culties that occurred during the factory expansion
predisposed the MD to limit the scope of the IT system
to reduce costs. He ignored the careful planning
advocated by the Research Team and purchased a
standalone accounting and order-processing system
recommend to him by a personal contact. It is unli-
kely, however, that the Teaching Company Directo-
rate would have funded a proposal based upon such
limited objectives.
A framework was developed to explore the diffi-
culties that the Research Team experienced working
with CableCo. This framework explains how poli-
tical processes shaped the technology that was
adopted. The primary problems were not technical,
but were due to internal political factors. The incon-
gruence between the ‘technological frames’ of the
Research Team and the MD were analysed in terms
of four domains (type of partnership, nature of
technology, technology structure and technology
in use). The IT system that was implemented met
the requirements of order processing and account-
ing, but did not support manufacturing, which
retained manual systems. This bias reflected the
dominant ‘frame’ of the MD who took personal
responsibility for these functions as well as market-
ing. It also explains the inconsistencies between the
marketing and manufacturing strategies, which
undermined the viability of the factory expansion.
The profitable production of low margin, high
volume products required costs to be minimised.
However, the make-to-order manufacturing strategy,
increased costs and exposed customers to the cumu-
lative lead-time. The lack of IT support for manu-
facturing led to suboptimum capacity utilisation,
poor delivery performance and made partial ship-
ments common.
This case study describes the issues that the
Research Team faced trying to create the necessary
legitimacy to suggest an alternative to the established
configuration of technological, organisational and
human resources. The framework shows that the
formation and implementation of IT should result
from a process of ‘mutual adaptation’ [32]. However,
the study confirms that where incongruent ‘techno-
logical frames’ exist, ‘configurational intrapreneurs’
will experience considerable difficulties and conflict
developing and implementing an IT system. In these
circumstances, the type of system that is implemented
is likely to be determined by the dominant ‘frame’.
This is because technologies are social artefacts that
embody the objectives, values and interests of the
designer and the purchaser. In the case of manage-
ment, this includes decision-making authority, how
processes should be organised, what the division of
labour should be, and how much autonomy employ-
ees should have [33]. IT consultants should recognise
that they are not just implementing a technology; they
are engaging in political processes.
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